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Children as an Object of the Right-Wing Populist 
Politics and Discourse in Poland
Alons enfants de la Patrie
La Marseillaise
La Révolution dévore ses propres enfants 
Danton
Abstract
In Central and Eastern Europe populist regimes are attracting attention as 
a result of the traumatic legacy of communism, the subsequent overburdening 
reforms and exhausting systemic transformation, resurgence of ever-lurking 
nationalism, regional conservatism, parochialism and cultural chauvinism, 
and/or as an example of the structural shortcomings of young democracies 
at the borders of civilization. The subject literature also indicates numerous 
and universal elements of populist governments, present as well in this part 
of Europe. Without prejudging the aptness and strength of these various 
concepts and arguments, this article is an attempt to include in these wide-
ranging themes a particular issue that absorbs conservative populists, namely 
“childhood” and “children”. While the problem of children in politics has 
already received numerous interpretations, the importance of childhood in 
the right-wing populist discourse and politics has so far remained an issue 
discussed only occasionally. We put forward the thesis that children play an 
important and specifi c role in the right-wing populist superstructure – they 
constitute an illusory picture of the nation, an allegory of its renewal, as 
well as a convenient, though inconsistently used, instrument for achieving 
political, ideological and propaganda goals. Attitudes towards children can 
be an important characteristic of populism as such, and should be taken 
into account in research on the subject. We will illustrate these problems 
using the example of Poland and the populist Law and Justice (PiS) Party 
that is in power there now. 
Keywords: Populism, Children, Biopolitics, Central Europe, Eastern 
Europe, Law and Justice, Poland
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Introduction
Some people believe that the so-called “world of children” exists in 
its biological dimension as a separate world unto itself. They interpret it 
either romantically as pure and innocent, or see uncouth and wayward 
creatures that need to be properly raised and trained. This latter view 
is how the pioneers of anthropology, such as Edward Burnett Taylor1 or 
John Lubbock2 perceived children. While interpreting the evolution of 
mankind and civilization, they compared children to exotic representatives 
of primitive peoples, i.e. as underaged, dependent, irrational and 
unproductive beings who should be kept at a safe distance from public 
affairs. The world of children should also be protected from its antithesis: 
a politics that appears to some as rational, and to others as a dirty profession 
and cynical sphere of competition and violence. In both cases, however, 
it is outside the domain of children. The adherents of this view maintain 
that while children are entitled to something like citizenship, they do not 
yet have the social and political subjectivity that would entitle them to 
any signifi cant and substantial rights. 
However, the very opposite claim with regard to “children’s status” is just 
as common, and has become more and more popular since the fundamental 
ethnographic research of Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict.3 On the basis 
of this alternative and the more socially-oriented paradigm, which breaks 
with the determinism of biology, the close relationship between the child 
and the world of politics and culture has always been part of the universal 
process of socialization, therefore building any age barriers – along with 
imaginary lines of what belongs to children and what belongs to the world 
of adults – is a more or less disguised form of discrimination, prejudice, 
and condescension.4 In the 1970s, constructivism strengthened the thesis 
that “childhood” is a social phenomenon, created in a similar way as, for 
instance, the concept of “gender”. 
The competing points of view do not exclude the use of children as 
pawns, i.e. instrumentally, which has always been practiced in widely-
differing cultures and ideologies. Children’s fate has often been considered 
1  E.B. Taylor, Primitive Culture, London 1903, p. 7 
2  J. Lubbock, The origin of civilisation and the primitive condition of Man, New York, 
Bombay and Calcutta 1912, p. 6.
3  M. Mead, Coming of Age in Samoa, New York 1928; R. Benedict, Continuities 
and discontinuities in cultural conditioning, “Psychiatry”, no. I/1938, pp. 161–167, DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00332747.1938.11022182.
4  The lack of such a distinction can be equally discriminatory, as illustrated by 
French historian Philippe Ariès in his book L’Enfant et la vie familiale sous l’Ancien 
Régime, Paris 1975, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/3319068.
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to be to fulfi l the hopes for a better future, and their education brought 
with it promises of redemption for nations and cultures. With children in 
mind, revolutions were justifi ed and great social and educational reforms 
were implemented, ideological fi ghts were fought, political opponents 
were criticized for their use of children, and propaganda activities were 
carried out. In the name of God, natural rights, and tradition, but also in 
the name of the future utopias, their destiny has often been subjected to 
heavy trials involving indoctrination and lawlessness. In the principles of 
education, the rules of a patriotic education and other forms of broadly 
understood bildung, as well as in social programs aimed at children, faith 
in tradition was rebuilt and the most avant-garde visions of moral, social 
and political organization were spelled out. The innocence of children 
inspired the imagination of reformers and the fantasies of political 
extremists. Therefore, the discussion has always been about what could 
be gained or lost. Investments in childhood have usually made it diffi cult 
to see who children really are and what they really need, and carry the 
constant risk of their lives being instrumentalised by adults obsessed with 
distant, sometimes foggy and ill-considered, cultural and political ideals. 
Political philosophy has usually treated children as a common good – 
the property of the community (nation), and/or private (family) property, 
in both instances viewed as a blank slate that should be properly fi lled with 
the appropriate personality patterns and courses of action as the children 
develop. Different approaches – conservative rather than liberal ones – 
appear quite frequently and freely in paternalist and populist practices 
all around Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland. Here we fi nd 
numerous examples of actions, more or less intentional and deliberate, 
that affect children. Populists use them to antagonize society, fuel national 
myths, nourish panic and ideological disputes, as well as for propaganda 
purposes that delegitimize their perceived enemies. 
Children and the Logic of Antagonism
The populist slogan “We must defend our children” is also one of those 
most oft-used phrases in Poland to stigmatize others. Here in Poland we 
can hear and read that children should be protected from and against: 
“gender sexualization”, “leftist ideologies”, “rainbow propaganda”, 
“multiculturalism”, etc. One can get the impression that the well-being 
and morality of children and families needs to be properly cared for in 
the context of a cultural confl ict that threatens Polishness. On the other 
side of this dispute, we most often encounter the Western world, which 
is – in the interpretation of conservative populists – mainly a source of 
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demoralization and collapse: full of “non-heteronormative degenerates” 
and “bizarre feminists” representing the “civilization of death”; as well as 
“paranoid terroecologists” who cynically exploit minors and sick children 
for their dirty business and heartless materialists and atheists who have 
renounced God: in a word – of a whole host of derailed liberals and leftists 
representing the “caste” and “salon” of the establishment.
Dividing people and introducing such vague and harmful distinctions 
belongs to the very essence of populist regimes and societies susceptible 
to their manipulation; regimes which polarise the world according to 
different criteria and at different levels, i.e. political: the democratic 
majority vs. the minority; social: the people vs. the elites; institutional: 
the corrupt vs. the honest; ontological: our own vs. foreign (the others); 
moral: good vs. bad; ideological: right vs. left; economic: poor vs. rich; 
religious: believers vs. godless atheists; racial: white vs. coloured; and 
even sexual: heterosexual vs. LGBTQ+. As emphasized by Mudde and 
Kaltwasser, separating people is a universal feature of the thin-centred 
ideology of populism.5 This “negative dialectic” allows populists to pursue 
a policy of simple and obvious solutions, in which there is no room for 
nuances. This is accompanied by the eternal risk of a xenophobic dislike, 
as well as anti-social practices of suspicion and innuendo, in line with 
the obsession that “other Satans are here at work”.6 The simplicity of 
the images marked as the “axes of evil” is understood by the majority 
of citizens who, thanks to their recognition of them, can organize 
their experienced world and the external – more distant and abstract 
– one. ‘Evil’ thus comes to include the representatives of the judiciary 
who received their appointments during the communist era and those 
appointed by them; teachers who do not understand their educational 
mission; doctors incapable of disinterestedly curing ills; entrepreneurs 
enfranchised by social wealth; and journalists and intellectuals stung by 
a Hegelian bite. In short, these ‘evil representatives’ include the upper 
class of society and a large part of the upper middle class. Other bad or 
misguided structures include the European Union, which broke through 
the back door and instructs on how to behave; European powers that 
view new democracies condescendingly, shamelessly exploiting them for 
cheap labour and markets; globalization, enlightenment, immigration, 
etc. This means that at the root of any populism lies a hostility that always 
5  C. Mudde, R.C. Kaltwasser, Working Paper: Voices Of The Peoples: Populism in 
Europe And Latin America Compared, 2011, https://kellogg.nd.edu/sites/default/fi les/
old_fi les/documents/378_0.pdf (access 5.02.2021).
6  The words of the Polish writer Kornel Ujejski (1823–1897), used by Jarosław 
Kaczyński in one of his public statements. 
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makes it revolutionary. As Ernesto Laclau states: “There is no populism 
without the discursive construction of an enemy: the ancient regime, 
the oligarchy, the Establishment, or whatever”.7 This fabrication of the 
enemy, and not only in the discursive sense, organizes both the perceived 
harm and the resentment of the excluded, as well as the worldview of 
those increasingly lost in a world where “all that is solid melts into the 
air”. This strategic procedure creates a feeling of constant threat and 
uncertainty and mobilizes the readiness of the ‘masses’ to confront, 
clash, and fi ght.
Children play a special role in this politics of antagonism. It is through 
them that an innocent adversary becomes a potentially deadly and evil 
enemy. In the language of bio-populism, children constitute the “body” 
of the people, the essence of what is potentially the best and healthiest. 
Everything that threatens them is the worst. Polish Prime Minister 
Mateusz Morawiecki offered such a vision in his exposé: “«Such will 
be the Commonwealth as their youth will be kept».8 It is our children 
and grandchildren who will build the Poland we miss.” Children are the 
folk idealization of the nation – the embodiment of the innocent and the 
honest, but also the harmed, marginalized and poor, who preserve the 
noblest virtues and almost the truth itself. In the social imaginaries, they 
always embody infi nite opportunities, open possibilities, and hopes for 
self-fulfi lment. This has obvious consequences: crimes against children 
take on an additional dimension and meaning. Rape infl icted on the 
youngest is a violence against the nation and its moral and spiritual future. 
The images of threats faced by the children, fuelled by the authorities, 
apply equally to the entire ‘great national family’. 
In this article I put forward the thesis that in this populist policy of 
antagonisms, childhood issues and problems are instrumentally used in 
government policy, which in practice means either disregard for them or 
excessive interference with their autonomy. You can see this phenomenon 
in, inter alia, the increasing focus on the threats to which children are 
allegedly exposed. This kind of action is expressed in two ways: 1) by 
diagnosing the threats and offering ‘help’; and 2) by tightening the law, 
not only in connection with the direct physical violence against children, 
but also against the lurking social and symbolic violence, most often 
defi ned as “depravation”. The elusive nature of this symbolic violence 
allows it to be manipulated quite freely; either exaggerated or diminished. 
7  E. Laclau, Populism: What’s in a Name?, in: Populism and the Mirror of Democracy, 
ed. F. Panizza, London 2005, p. 39.
8  Words of Jan Zamojski (1546–1605), written in 1600 on the occasion of the 
opening of the Zamoyski Academy.
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I will show that this also applies to direct crimes against children, which 
are sometimes ignored and sometimes exaggerated.9
In the program declaration of the ruling PiS party, we fi nd: “The 
spread of gender ideology is dangerous for the family and for parenthood 
in Poland; (...) Establishing barriers to the spread of gender ideology 
is important (...)”;10 “The institutions of the Polish state have begun to 
effectively defend Polish families and children living outside Poland 
against unfair decisions made by the authorities of their state of residence, 
e.g. Germany, Norway”.11 And fi nally: “We will effectively support 
families in a social, material and legal sense; protect their autonomy from 
ideological offensives; and take actions against domestic violence. We will 
not replace parents in freely shaping their child’s development. PiS will 
oppose any attacks on the family, which fi gures in the constitution as the 
subject of special state protection”.12 Thus we read in the party’s program 
about various external threats, resulting from, among others, the policy 
of equality, known in Poland as “gender ideology”, or the allegedly anti-
Polish activities of supervision institutions in some Western countries. 
This gives the impression of an organized activity consciously directed 
against Polish children, which is an obvious abuse, because the activity of 
the Jugendamts in Germany and Austria or the Barnevernets in Norway 
– to which allusions are made – although they may be controversial, also 
include non-Polish families under the same supervision. In PiS’s program, 
the authority of the family is unconditionally placed on a pedestal, which 
creates a false image of children who belong exclusively to their families, 
although it is obvious that parents protect their children primarily in 
accordance with applicable law, accepted norms and social obligations. 
At the same time, as it is clear from the cited declarations that politicians 
themselves wish to decide what constitutes an “attack” on the family. 
Economic arguments are repeatedly formulated about neglected 
children, living below the poverty line or unfairly taken over by the state 
because of their hardships. The impression is created that the wealth of 
some is gained at the expense of the weak and the poor, and especially 
against their children. Ex-Prime Minister Beata Szydło stated in her 
exposé: “Poles often say that the Polish justice system is not fair. It is not 
fair to those who are weaker, who are poor, (...) isn’t it a shame for the 
Polish state, for all of us, that today in Poland parents are taken from their 
9  M. Szafrańska, Penalny populizm a media, Kraków 2015.
10  Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości, Polski Model Państwa Dobrobytu, 2019, p. 11, 
http://pis.org.pl/fi les/Program_PIS_2019.pdf (access 5.02.2021). 
11  Ibidem, p. 175.
12  Ibidem, p. 219. 
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children only because the family has a low income? Isn’t that our shame? 
You don’t want to see it! We have seen it and we will change it”.13 The 
Prime Minister’s speech combines poverty and injustice with its criticism 
of the political elite. The image of hungry children being taken over by 
offi cials is a propaganda ploy used against the political opposition. 
This sense of danger is built in connection with the defence of the 
conceived life. The issue of tightening the abortion law returns regularly, 
both under pressure from the Polish Church and under civic initiatives. 
It has been ruled on in court and/or parliament at least three times 
during PiS rule. First it led to massive demonstrations and the so-called 
“black umbrellas” protest in 2017; the second time the case returned to 
Parliament in the context of the “Stop the abortion!” project, initiated by 
the Życie i Rodzina (Life and Family) Foundation – a pro-life organization 
that actively fi ghts against the LGBT+ community. In the third instance 
this problem returned with great force following the handing down of 
a decision by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, which ruled that the 
right to obtain an abortion in cases of severe and irreversible damage to the 
foetus was inconsistent with the Polish Constitution, and thus arbitrarily 
ended the so-called “abortion compromise” in force in Poland since 1993. 
In this regard, many populist forces directly refer to the Christian 
tradition and the stances of the Catholic Church. This strategy contains as 
much authenticity as pure opportunism and cynicism, because the support 
of such a signifi cant institution as the Church constitutes invaluable 
capital for any political party, particularly in Poland. Moreover, in strongly 
religious societies populist Manichaeism falls on fertile ground, because 
by nature national populists, like most religious people, see the world in 
black and white terms. In populist language, the fate of children is all-
too-often determined by anti-Christian ideologies, the “civilization of 
death”, permissive liberalism, cosmopolitism, consumerism, hedonism, 
materialism, and so on. In short, children are threatened by a sick culture 
that has renounced its own roots. The political leader of the Law and Justice 
party – Jarosław Kaczyński – is convinced that there are deliberate attempts 
to destroy Christianity, European culture, and the family, and that “(...) there 
is an attempt to create such a world in which, in fact, nothing is certain; 
there is no identity, even the most elementary identities do not exist”.14 Such 
apocalyptic claims belong to classical repertoire of populist statements. 
13  Exposé of Prime Minister Beata Szydło of 2015, https://www.gov.pl/web/pre-
mier/stenogram-expos-premier-beaty-szydlo (access 1.04.2021).




Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 2/2021
Children, being in fact the most vulnerable and helpless, are constantly 
present and even over-represented in populist rhetoric and actions. It can 
be said that by using children as political tools, populists want to play the 
role of caring parents and guardians of the nation, that ruthlessly fi ght 
against the violence and evil. They claim to be able to see and perceive the 
most important problems fully and totally, the ignored dimensions of harm 
– innocent victims of neglect and injustice. Populists therefore insist on 
tougher laws on offenses and crimes to fi ght against those who evade their 
maintenance/support obligations, paedophiles, irreversible degenerates 
and child killers, be it on account of child pornography, abduction, or 
demoralization. In May 2019, the Minister of Justice, Zbigniew Ziobro, 
presented plans to tighten the criminal law, especially with regard to 
sexual offenses. The project proposed, inter alia, increasing the age of 
the legal and criminal protection of children from 15 to 16; increasing 
the penalty for rape on a minor from 15 to 30 years of imprisonment; an 
annuity for the death of a child as a result of rape; abolishing the statute 
of limitations for the crime of rape; extending the information contained 
in the register of paedophiles, etc. While this direction in the tightening 
of the law is overall appreciated and approved by the majority of Poles, 
the greatest controversy accompanies the proposed citizenship act, which 
provides penalties for so-called “praising sexual intercourse”.15 This 
fuzzy bill that may, for example stigmatize teachers, is clearly a defensive 
reaction to the guidelines of the World Health Organization regarding the 
standards for sexual education for children. In general, we are dealing here 
in principle with moral verdicts rather than with a prophylaxis of solving 
children’s problems, and therefore with rather theoretical and ‘show’ 
acts of indignation calculated for ideological fi ghts, with children in the 
background rather than refl ecting a genuine concern for their lives. 
Child Rights and National Obsessions
The fact that right-wing populism in Central and Eastern Europe 
was developed in open confrontation with liberal and constitutional 
democracy is quite widely-recognized today in the subject literature.16 
15  The draft amendment to the Penal Code, in the drafting process since October 
2019, entitled “Stop Pedophilia” was submitted by the Pro – Prawo do do Życia (Pro-
Life) Foundation.
16  V. Tismăneanu, Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism and Myth 
in Post-Communist Europe, Princeton 1998; DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
postcomstud.2008.03.006; C. Mudde, The Populist Zeitgeist, “Government and Op-
position”, no. 39(4)/2004, pp. 541–563; DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053
.2004.00135.x; B. Bugaric, Populism, Liberal Democracy, and the Rule of Law in Cen-
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Some populist politicians, such as Victor Orban or Jarosław Kaczyński, 
openly emphasize the need to create a non-liberal or illiberal form of 
an allegedly communal alternative, for example under the slogan of the 
“Polish model of the welfare state”. An interesting question dividing 
theorists is whether populism is therefore a pathology, a correction, or 
the essence of democracy17 Violating the constitution and a disregard 
for international obligations and human rights are certainly a threat to 
liberal democracy and an aberration and pathology, but social practices 
incorporating citizens, e.g. by including them in the stream of politics 
and the economy, in the name of the ever-popular bourgeois revolution 
slogan “We, the people” doesn’t necessarily fall into this category. 
According to the classical concept of democracy, winning elections 
gives rise to unlimited authority to decide about the state. This is how 
the right-wing populists usually wish to understand democracy: as the 
ultimate right of the majority to exercise power, independently from 
any obligations resulting from universal human rights, or the rules of 
the balance of power. In other words, they deliberately undermine the 
order of liberal democracies. It must be made very clear that populist 
regimes in Eastern Europe, such as the PiS party in Poland, benefi t from 
this ambiguity (democracy versus liberal democracy). They defi ne their 
“truly democratic” form of political community in terms of national 
identity, which creates a dangerous temptation to apply the law one way 
to “their own” and differently to the so-called “aliens”. This chauvinistic 
logic is sometimes applied not only to foreigners, but also to anyone who 
could be arbitrarily considered as foreign to the national representation. 
The concept of a “traitor to the nation” and other excluding terms and 
invectives are obsessively repeated in Poland every day. Children are also 
affected by the problem of exclusion.
In liberal democratic states, the issue of child rights emerged relatively 
recently. In John Rawls’s Theory of Justice, a work that discusses the rules 
of an impartial social contract with unprecedented meticulousness, the 
issue of children as potential participants in a so-called “contract behind 
tral and Eastern Europe, “Communist and Post-Communist Studies”, no. 41(2)/2008, 
pp. 191–203, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2008.03.006.
17  P. Taggart, Populism and the pathology of representative politics, in: Democracies and 
the populist challenge, eds. Y. Mény, Y. Surel, Basingstoke 2002, pp. 62–80, DOI: https://
doi.org/10.1057/9781403920072_4; T. Akkerman, Populism and Democracy: Challenge 
or Pathology, “Acta Politica”, no. 38/2003, pp. 147–159; DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/
palgrave.ap.5500021; Y. Mény, Y. Surel, The Constitutive Ambiguity of Populism, in: De-
mocracies and the Populist Challenge, eds. Y. Mény, Y. Surel, London 2002; P. Dejneka, 
Populizm a sfera publiczna. Czy populizm zrewitalizuje sferę publiczną w Europie, Wars-
zawa 2019, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403920072_1.
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the veil of ignorance” establishing the principles of a fair state is discussed 
as if the lack of their moral and civic competences were obvious.18 From 
the beginning of the 1970s, one can speak of a breakthrough related to the 
development of social constructivism and attempts to empower children.19 
The need to take them into account has become more and more often 
considered, and children’s rights have begun to ever more absorb the 
imagination of politicians and the public. At the same time, the concept 
of democratic representation began to be redefi ned, sometimes the 
electoral age was lowered, looking for ways to include young people in 
social communication and emphasizing the importance of participation, 
creating children’s parliaments and other representations in important 
state institutions. The areas of children’s political activity have become an 
element of research for good.20 As Kallio and Häkli claim: “(...) children 
engage in various kinds of politics in which they have their own positions 
and roles – politics which cannot be known before children’s quotidian 
lives are studied as potentially political”.21
Right-wing populism, on the other hand, resists these tendencies to 
empower children and calls for moral conservatism – strengthening the 
role of the family/parents and school (state) in the educational process, 
stopping the liberalization and social emancipation, which are seen as 
sources of disintegration of the national identity and the causes behind 
the breakdown of all interpersonal and intergenerational relationships. 
Paternalistic power is treated as a good in itself, almost analogously to 
government power exercised over the nation in the public sphere, or church 
power exercised in the moral and metaphysical dimension. As a result, 
the PiS government’s political priority is to include schools more and 
more in memory politics, as well as moral and patriotic education. Young 
people are expected to have “greater political awareness”, which is usually 
understood as being critical of the liberal human rights’ ethics and other 
18  J. Rawls, Theory of Justice (revised edition), Cambridge MA. 1999, p. 397–449. 
19  J. La Fontaine, An anthropological perspective on children, in: Children of Social 
Worlds, eds. M. Richards, P. Light, Cambridge 1986. 
20  E. Such, R. Walker, Young citizens or policy objects? Children in the ‘rights and 
responsibilities’ debate, “Journal of Social Policy”, no. 34(1)/2005, pp. 39–57, DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279404008256; S. White, S. Choudhury, The politics of 
child participation in international development: the dilemma of agency, “The European 
Journal of Development Research”, no. 19(4)/2007, pp. 529–550, DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1080/09578810701667508; T. Skelton, Taking young people as political actors se-
riously: opening the borders of political geography, “Area”, no. 42/2010, pp. 145–151, DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4762.2009.00891.x.
21  K.P. Kallio, J. Häkli, Are There Politics in Childhood?, “Space and Polity”, 
no. 15(1)/2011, p. 22, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13562576.2011.567897.
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forms of universalism. Encouraging fuzzy communitarian feelings is not 
even a plausible way to educate children about patriotism and responsible 
citizenship. On the other hand, this form of education can foster crowds 
of “other-directed personalities”, and in the future also authoritarian 
citizens mindlessly stigmatizing all diversity. Paradoxically, we are 
dealing in Poland with a recidivism of authoritarianism, characteristic of 
the communist era. 
In the case of Poland however, the consequences of such ideologization, 
laced with nationalistic obsessions, are unfortunately much more tangible. 
For example, the state restricts the possibilities of protecting children in 
accordance with the postulates of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. Poland has so far not ratifi ed the 3rd Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which gives the UN Committee 
on the Rights of the Child the competence to receive and recognize 
individual notifi cations of violations of children’s rights. The ambiguous 
viewpoint about children’s rights, and thus their subjective treatment, 
is clearly visible for example in the way of thinking of the new Polish 
Ombudsman for Children, Mikołaj Pawlak,22 who indeed discusses 
the rights of children, but primarily of the unborn (i.e. in the context 
of prohibiting abortions). With regard to a child’s right to a complete 
education (including, until recently, obligatory sex education classes), he 
stresses that such classes constitute a threat to family autonomy and can 
potentially leads to demoralisation; and when it comes to the situation 
of children of non-heteronormative parents, he consistently emphasizes 
that these children are exposed to the dangers of harmful ideologies. One 
example is the dispute over the transcription of a foreign birth certifi cate 
of a child whose parents are of the same sex. In Poland, the lack of such 
a possibility violates the Polish Citizenship Act, the European Convention 
on Human Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The 
case could probably be clarifi ed on the basis of the existing law if it were not 
politicized through the direct involvement of the Minister of Justice and 
the General Prosecutor, who openly argue that such a refusal is consistent 
with Polish law. Ultimately, the Supreme Administrative Court upheld 
the ban, although it also ordered the issuance of an identifi cation number 
to the child, which is necessary to obtain citizenship.
Children are often included in cultural disputes that accompany ethni-
cally diverse countries ruled by right-wing populists. Such controversies 
have recently been aggravated due to the 2015 immigration crisis, which 
22  M. Dagiel, M. Kowalik-Olubińska, Bycie dziecka w Polsce „dobrej zmiany”– mię-
dzy Konwencją o Prawach Dziecka a rzeczywistością, “Problemy Wczesnej Edukacji”, 
no. 4(43)/2018, pp. 114–124, DOI: https://doi.org/10.26881/pwe.2018.43.11.
78
Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 2/2021
has put human rights policy to the test. In Central and Eastern Europe, for 
example, the integration (or actually non-integration) of Roma children is 
a constant and recurring problem. The Roma minority in many countries 
in this part of Europe (Romania, Bulgaria or Hungary) are considered to 
be the source of genuine social problems: in particular crimes and unem-
ployment. But the way chosen to resolve these issues usually consists of 
stigmatizing this minority and threatening its extensive growth, as well as 
playing on numerous unjustifi ed and unfair stereotypes.23 Like other mi-
norities, the Roma play the role of the scapegoat – the alleged cause of all 
kinds of evils and pathologies. Their condemnation belongs thus to the 
classical repertoire of populist racism and discrimination. For example, 
it is quite common to segregate Roma children in special schools, under 
the pretext of addressing their “peculiar” lifestyle and “maladjustment”, 
as takes place in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Croatia.24 In 
the populists’ language, Roma citizens constitute a culturally-alien and 
diffi cult to supervise “factor”. 
Negative attitude towards immigrants is also a common phenomenon 
in this part of Europe, which results from numerous historical, social, and 
structural conditions, as well as from ad hoc populist policies. It is quite 
diffi cult thus to judge whether the government is acting realistically and 
simply takes into account the prevailing public opinion, or whether it 
instrumentally misuses and abuses the public’s stereotypes and fears. In 
either case however, these actions do not give either immigrants or the 
societies the chance for a more civilized, morally mature and empathic 
view of reality. Children, who make up a large proportion of the immigrant 
population, are also direct victims of this xenophobic immigration policy. 
Numerous problems of children’s rights in this regard were already noted 
by the previous Ombudsman for child rights in Poland, Marek Michalak 
in his letter to the Prime Minister.25 For example, he pointed out the 
insuffi cient protection of children at the state borders, the violation of 
the provisions of the Geneva Convention, and/or the unjustifi ed and 
23  Cf. M. Stewart, The Gypsy ‘menace’: Populism and the New Anti-Gypsy Poli-
tics, London 2012; Populism, Memory and Minority Rights: Central Eastern Euro-
pean Issues in Global Perspective, ed. A.-M. Bíró, Boston 2018, DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1163/9789004386426.
24  Cf. M. Billout, Rapport d´information fait au nom de la commission des affaires 
européennes sur l’intégration des roms: un défi  pour l’union européenne et ses états membres, 
2012, https://www.senat.fr/rap/r12-199/r12-199_mono.html; Amnesty International, 
Portes ouvertes sur l’avenir. Non à la ségrégation des enfants Roms dans les écoles slovaques, 
2010, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR720042010FRENCH.
PDF (access 8.02.2021).
25  M. Michalak, Letter to Prime Minister, 2018. Document nr GA8.422.10.2018.BS. 
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prolonged detention of minor foreigners. The situation has not changed 
in this respect. According to the reports of the Association for Legal 
Intervention [Polish: Stowarzyszenie Interwencji Prawnej], children’s 
centres constitute about a quarter of all closed detention centres. 
Children are also increasingly victims of racist violence, which can also 
be seen as a consequence of anti-immigrant sentiments either fuelled 
by, or at least downplayed by the authorities. The increasing problems 
of racism and discrimination against children did not go unnoticed by 
the aforementioned Ombudsman, who in 2018 – after three years of rule 
by the PiS – pointed out that: “(…) attacks based on discrimination are 
taking place more and more often in Poland, and these attacks are not 
only offensive words addressed to foreigners or people who communicate 
in foreign languages, but often turn into physical aggression, in extreme 
cases even towards children”.26 
Discrimination based on ethnic, religious, or national origins is 
particularly striking in the context of the objections made by Polish 
Government to the European Commission against such states as the 
United Kingdom, Germany or Austria – which have considered limiting 
social support to workers whose children live outside the borders of their 
country (kindergeld). Such plans were outlined in December 2017 by 
Sebastian Kurz from the conservative Austrian People’s Party (OeVP), 
while in Germany a similar initiative was launched in 2016 by the then-
SPD politician and economy minister Sigmar Gabriel, and in the UK by 
David Cameron. These initiatives were mainly directed at employees from 
Central and Eastern Europe. It is certainly a good thing that the Polish 
government cares about the interests of Polish children, but this policy 
should also apply to all including immigrant children in the country and 
should be in accordance with EU equality standards.
Gender, Family and Moral Panic
Caring for children is a natural and biologically conditioned refl ex 
of parents, therefore exploiting it is almost subliminal, and it certainly 
works on atavistic protective instincts. Additionally, increased concern 
for the safety of children is almost a sign of our times and a refl ection of 
cultural changes. The development of new technologies, liberalization, 
globalization, and other cultural challenges simultaneously increase the 
need for parental control, as well as give rise to numerous obsessions and 
26  M. Michalak, Ibidem, Postawy rasistowskie i ksenofobiczne się nasilają. Jak 
temu przeciwdziałać? Rzecznik pisze do premiera Morawieckiego i ministra Ziobry. 
Document nr XI.518.5.2018.
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the anxiety of overprotection. In many countries of the region, including in 
Poland, this goes hand-in-hand with the belief, expressed for many years, 
that family happiness is, next to health, the most important value. Some 
populist regimes use all these factors in their activities, highlighting the 
importance of family and health policy. This tendency certainly underpins 
numerous and often useful social programs, yet concerns are being raised 
that the modernization is a source of degenerative cultural changes, 
a threat to the safety, happiness, and health of families and children. As 
a result, conservative populism, with its hysterical and indignant reactions 
to everything new and different, preys on backwardness, psychosis, and 
confusion, and contributes to moral panic. 
The problems associated with traditional gender divisions and the 
stigmatization of alternative family models (informal, cohabitation, 
blended families, etc.), and especially concerns about homosexual 
partnerships, are exploited almost obsessively by most conservative and 
populist politicians, who view them as an example of the demoralization 
and ideological distortion of European culture. An equally rigid and 
fearmongering stance is formulated with regard to the sexual education of 
children, which is constantly seen as a conspiratorial operation of leftist 
circles. In November 2019, Prime Minister Morawiecki emphasized in 
his exposé that the family should be “untouchable”, and whoever raises 
an “ideological hand” on this “arch-Polish value” raises it on the entire 
Polish community. The reaction of Jarosław Kaczyński to the standards 
of sex education in Europe recommended by the WHO, as well as to the 
Warsaw declaration for the LGBT+ community, is also very telling. The 
PiS leader said: “As we know, it is about sexualization of children from 
an early age. We have to fi ght it. We must defend the Polish family. We 
have to defend the Polish family with full determination, and even with 
ferocity, because this is a civilizational threat, not only for Poland, but 
for the whole of Europe, and for the whole civilization that was created 
on the basis of Christianity”.27 It should be added that, as a consequence, 
a number of local governments in Poland came up with the idea of so-
called “LGBT-free zones”, which provoked the protests of many countries 
and even the severance of relations on the part of some partner cities.28 
Although such declarations may be underpinned by Christian 
worldviews and express concern for the traditional family model, they also 
violate modern standards of freedom and equality, as well as discriminate 
27  https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/439323-prezes-pis-trzeba-bronic-polskiej-rodziny 
(access 5.02.2021).
28  This applies, for example, to the Dutch city of Nieuwegein and the French 
Douai towards Puławy, or the French Saint-Jean-de-Braye towards Tuchów.
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against non-heteronormative families and children. This is an expression 
not only of a lack of sensitivity, but of the infl iction of a mindless harm on 
the weakest, who have to bear the consequences of the rulers’ ideological 
ploys, games and obsessions. The so-called “LGBT ideology” (whatever 
that means) was the leitmotif of the presidential campaign (successful) of 
Andrzej Duda, who emphasized at every step that in this debate we are 
dealing not so much with specifi c people with different sexual orientations, 
but with an aggressive ideology imposed on Polish citizens in an analogous 
way to Bolshevism.
Ideological thinking, moral conservatism, or the misuse of religious 
ethics by the authorities appears not only in the form of open aversion 
to LGBT communities, but also hits other aspects of the physical 
existence of citizens. In June 2016, the Polish government withdrew 
from programs for co-fi nancing IVF treatments, and in July 2017 it 
also introduced prescriptions for contraceptives, including emergency 
contraceptive pills. Some representatives of the ruling party pointed to 
the physical handicaps of children born through in vitro fertilization, 
contributing to their stigmatization. In 2016, the postulates of tightening 
the abortion law and banning abortion for both raped women and those 
whose unborn children are burdened with serious genetic defects (the so-
called eugenic abortion) returned. An argument was put forward that the 
tightening of abortion regulations was supposed to express the right to 
life of unborn children, and thus express innate and inalienable human 
rights. This discussion caused numerous controversies and social unrest 
– in particular the so-called “black protest” in 2017.29 In October 2020, 
following the decision of the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of 
Poland banning abortions for mothers with unborn children with fatal 
foetus defects (FFAs), the largest protests in free Poland since 1989 swept 
across the country under the slogan of “Women’s Strike”. The problem 
of reproductive justice and women’s rights has made children indirectly 
a central element of populist biopolitics and the subject of an ideological 
dispute. Ironically, the mass mobilization of the youngest citizens in 2020 
is a deeply moving and symbolic protest against the continuing policy of 
treating children instrumentally. Many commentators in Poland believe 
that the protests herald the end of Law and Justice’s rule, or even the end 
of a whole generation of politicians – “satraps” and “grandpops”. 
The reactions of populist parties in Central and Eastern Europe to 
the Convention on preventing and combating violence against women 
and domestic violence (the so-called Istambul Convention) are also quite 
29  Bunt kobiet. Czarne Protesty i Strajki Kobiet, eds. E. Korolczuk et al., Gdańsk 
2018.
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signifi cant. Plans to withdraw from the agreement have been declared by 
the PiS party since 2012, when the Convention was ratifi ed by Poland. 
The President of Poland, Andrzej Duda, described this document as 
“dangerous” and “perfi dious”, as well as “inconsistent with common 
sense”; ex-prime Minister Beata Szydło said that the Convention was 
a “hoax”; the current Minister of Justice stated that “this is a feminist 
product that is supposed to justify the gay ideology”; and in 2020 Deputy 
Minister of Justice Marcin Romanowski called the Convention “gender 
gibberish”. While in the end the Convention was not terminated, Amnesty 
International observers emphasize that the document remains a “dead 
letter”, referring to the fact that the provisions necessary to enforce it 
have not been included in the penal code nor in any anti-discriminatory 
prevention measures. 
The activities of PiS are part of the opposition to the mainstream 
gender policy. However, what is most striking is the lack of interest in 
the children themselves, who are one of the main targeted recipients of 
the benefi ts of the Convention. In Poland, the previous Ombudsman for 
Children also pointed to the neglect in creating a comprehensive strategy 
to combat violence against children, going beyond the so-called ‘family 
violence’ regulated by the archaic Polish Family and Guardianship Code. 
In this regard, we fi nd ourselves again with a mix of traditionalism and 
populism that follows well-established patterns of thinking and behaviour 
that ignore the interests of children. In Poland this is visible especially 
in the discussion on so-called “spanking” and the attempts to downplay 
or relativize this form of calling children to order by distinguishing it 
from “beating”; in other words disregarding the problem and allowing 
“milder” acts of violence against them. This is a striking inconsistency 
by a cynical power that instrumentally uses children in its ideological 
struggles. 
Ideologies and Children’s Education
We can fi nd a mixture of different ideologies concerning education 
and the upbringing of children in populist regimes. There are two main 
forms of populism that are of interest in this context. The fi rst treats 
populism as a simplifi ed, thin-centred ideology based on a dualistic world 
view, whereby the popular class acts against the corrupt and vicious elites 
in name of the sovereign nation and the inclusion of the “marginalised 
majority”. Sometimes this way of thinking is based on the so-called 
“political realism”, which refers to historical and cultural necessity and – 
allegedly morally justifi ed – paths of retaliation and redress. The second 
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form is the so-called “empty populism”, a tactic or form of political 
manipulation designed only for short-term success, not for long-term 
moral goals. Such a populism is devoid of content, however it freely uses 
other ideologies to justify its own actions and give them a deeper meaning 
and seriousness. In the case of the right-wing populism which dominates 
in Central and Eastern Europe, we fi nd a conjunctive combination of both 
these forms of populism within the framework of vulgarized forms of 
conservatism, nationalism, and religious ethics. These ideological aspects 
have a fundamental infl uence on the shape and course of the reform of 
children’s education. 
A widespread belief exists amongst populist conservative circles 
that Polish children have been badly brought up so far.30 Children and 
adolescents today are allegedly idle, superstitious, devoid of ambition, 
and effeminate. The existing forms of primary and higher education and 
the general directions of the so-called “critical education” (liberal) are 
questioned. Right-wing social pedagogy is primarily about creating and 
strengthening a healthy scepticism towards all those novelties which 
require overcoming traditional attitudes. Modernity and globalization are 
a source of fundamental problems for right-wing populists, whose alleged 
‘moral compasses’ point to avoidance of anything that is foreign and new. 
However, instead of arousing constructive criticism, this project may 
generate retrograde prejudices among children. Saturated with resentment 
and a sense of injustice, full of anachronistic ideas about social life and 
exaggerated and distorted stories woven from national myths, this project 
will only deepen the very sense of provincialism and loneliness that the 
Polish right is trying to fi ght against. 
There are numerous examples of moralizing politics, permeated with 
extreme megalomania, national haughtiness, intolerance, and illustrious 
romanticism. The new patriotic upbringing of children, which focuses 
on heroism and martyrdom, fuels a national sense of superiority and 
a combative attitude towards everything that is foreign. It shows how 
important children are as an element of the anti-liberal agenda of social re-
education, and how instrumentally they can be treated in this “mission”. 
Politicians seem to assume that children should be fi lled with a national 
content in order to create a “new man”, disregarding his (or her) real 
needs and expectations. Finally, it must be added that the mere critical 
assessment of the shape of civic education in the last two decades, and 
the obsession with the alleged permissiveness at schools, has not turned 
into any meaningful and convincing education project capable of dealing 
30  T. Tokarz, Konserwatyzm a edukacja demokratyczna, in: Demokracja i edukacja: 
dylematy, diagnozy, doświadczenia, eds. K. Gawlicz et al., Wrocław 2014, pp. 85–107.
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with the challenges of modern times. Instead, Polish children receive an 
upbringing that increases xenophobia and nationalism. 
Most expert bodies point out that the new core curricula in education 
advanced by PiS were created in a hurry: the programs are overloaded, 
underdeveloped, full of factual errors and shortcomings, and anachronistic 
in form and content. They abandon the integrated model of education in 
favour of a subjective and fragmentary education.31 The changes resulting 
from the reform favour the selection and segregation of children, and 
weakens the mechanisms of so-called “vertical mobility”32. The reform 
of education, described by critics in Poland as a “deformity”, supports 
students’ passivity. Children are treated as objects, they learn to be docile 
and subordinated. As noted by Klus-Stańska in the new core curriculum: 
“(...) the word “respect” appears 51 times, usually as showing respect for 
others, traditions, symbols, material goods and nature, etc., but “courage” 
appears only twice, “opposition” not at all, the term “disagree with the 
opinions” four times, and the word “resistance” is only about the resistance 
of water and the conductor. Experiencing and discovering one’s freedom 
appears uniquely in concern with the classes on ethics. (...) Children learn 
to write apologies, but not complaints. It is therefore clear how morally 
the primary school graduate is to be shaped”33. The core curriculum places 
a decided emphasis on Christian ethics and conservative customs and 
tradition, with little space for expressing one’s own beliefs and criticism. 
The ideological aspects of upbringing are particularly evident in the classes 
on “education for family life”, which replaced the “sex education” lessons 
in Poland. The policy of simple solutions applied in the education reform 
directly affects children, who are formed as passive creatures subjected 
to control – reproducing mental and symbolic patterns, distant not only 
from the individual, liberal or multicultural model, but simply irrational. 
It is to be feared that the new educational policy will not only weaken the 
competences of Polish children, but will also deepen the contemptuous 
attitude towards them. 
31  This opinion is expressed by, among others, the Committee of Pedagogical Sci-
ences, Committee on Literature Sciences of Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN), opinions 
of experts from the Polish Teachers’ Union (ZNP) and Social Society for Education 
(Polish STO), the Institute for Advanced Studies and many other national experts bod-
ies and societies. 
32  A. Dziemianowicz-Bąk, Polska wojna o szkołę, Warsaw 2017.
33  Kaganiec zamiast kaganka? Jak polska szkoła zmieniła się przez cztery lata rzą-
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Children in Social Projects
One of the most popular programs implemented by the PiS government 
has been the 500 Plus Program, a great project for the recipients but costly 
for the state budget, which pays parents 500 PLN per month for each child. 
For many marginalized and poor families, especially in the countryside 
and smaller towns, it has become a genuine source of fi nancial support. 
With a little kindness, this program can be treated as a reward for giving 
birth, and even as a form of a basic income guarantee. This type of direct 
fi nancial support mechanism for children was also supplemented by the 
annual school starter kit in the amount of PLN 300, as well as other forms 
of support that indirectly concern children, e.g. the Toddler Plus Program 
(a program for the development of childcare institutions), the Mother 
Plus (various rewards for women who quickly give birth to children), 
the Mama 4 Plus (a pension scheme for mothers who raise at least four 
children, but do not earn an income equal to the minimum pension).
The avant-garde and useful nature of the 500 Plus social program and 
other such projects related to children should not obscure the essence of 
the matter. Namely, children have again become not only the proverbial 
tongue in the weight of current politics, but also (together with their 
families) an instrument for exercising power. Social contributions to 
children not only make citizens feel a genuine debt of gratitude for such 
“generosity”, but according to universal cultural patterns the gift prompts 
them to express gratitude. The program can thus be thought of as a form 
of bribery for the recipients’ votes.
Despite the declarations of all opposition politicians that the bill will not 
be withdrawn, the party in power often scares the public with this prospect, 
which may indicate the true intentions of the rulers, i.e. treating this direct 
support as a form of soliciting voters. The 500 PLUS program was also 
used directly in a dispute over the Constitutional Tribunal. PiS politicians, 
including Kaczyński himself, maintained that the old composition of the 
Tribunal needed to be changed because it did not guarantee the successful 
implementation of this project awaited by citizens. Finally, it should be 
added that the socio-technically smart 500 Plus Program does not exhaust 
the issues of social policy towards children, which also includes health, 
education, and housing. As critics emphasize, when services and the 
creation of new institutions are at stake, and not only fi nancial instruments 
(discretionary money transfers beyond the actual control of politicized 
institutions), PiS’s social policy raises many more doubts.34 
34  M. Polakowski et al., Polityka Społeczna Rządu Prawa i Sprawiedliwości, Warsaw 
2017, pp. 8–9, https://library.fes.de/pdf-fi les/bueros/warschau/13848.pdf (access 8.02.2021). u
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Children and Propaganda
Talented or abused children are best suited for all emotional dealings, 
as well as for persuasion purposes, to show a rotten reality where the forces 
of good and childish innocence clash with the evil intentions of eternal 
enemies and national foes. Using children for propaganda purposes – 
common at least since World War I throughout the world – has strengthened 
the image of a paternal power exercised by politicians who deal with their 
gemeinschaft with alleged care, including the images and experiences of 
heroic and brave children as well as the abandoned, orphaned, exploited, 
maimed, or disabled. The fate of children was always supposed to not only 
shock and evoke extreme emotions of rage and helplessness, but also to 
mobilize others to fi ght against injustice and violence.
Today in democratic states – as in the times of wars, totalitarianism 
and military juntas – politicians still exploit children to shape the 
social imagination, preying on folk naivete and superfi cial reasoning. 
Polish politics is also not free from this. PiS politicians like to show 
up with children, talk publicly about what threatens them, stress their 
defencelessness and need for protection, as well as dream up the visions 
of great projects for the sake of both children and their homeland. 
There are many indications that politicians are doing this consciously 
and stubbornly for ideological as well as marketing reasons, balancing 
clumsily on the thin line that separates genuine concern for security or 
proper public relations from intrusive party and national propaganda. 
Let us take few signifi cant examples: in the 2015 election campaign, 
PiS showed photos of starving Polish children, which, as it turned out, 
could be bought in an online photo shop. Against the rule forbidding 
agitation in schools, in 2018 the PiS government distributed information 
and propaganda materials about the governments’ program “Good 
Start”. In New Year’s greetings, the Prime Minister appears in a wreath 
of children, as if they all belonged to him. Family picnics and football 
matches, where politicians show up in front of children and emphasize the 
importance they attach to family values, serve similar purposes. In August 
2019, in Stalowa Wola, Jarosław Kaczyński, surrounded by children 
dressed in national costumes, thanked the bishop for defending the idea 
of family. The bishop was famous for his claims about the threats of the 
“rainbow plague” (LGBT). Barbara Nowak, the curator of education in 
the Małopolska region, applied to the Government to award the Medal of 
the Commission of National Education to the football supporters of the 
Legia Warsaw Football Club, who not only constitute an important group 
of PiS voters, but also are known for their shocking propaganda methods 
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involving children, which fi t into the memory politics of the government 
fuel hostility and nationalism. For example, during a match Legia fans 
hung a shocking banner illustrating a German soldier putting a gun to 
the head of a little boy. The banner read: “During the Warsaw uprising 
Germans killed 160,000 people. Thousands of them were children”. In 
defence of the new memory politics, President Andrzej Duda said: “(...) 
today the children and grandchildren of the traitors of the Republic, who 
fought to maintain the Soviet domination over Poland, occupy many 
prominent positions in various places”.35 Although this phrase applies 
to people who are presumably already adults and is only an unjustifi ed 
presumption, it corresponds to the above-discussed belief that there are 
ideologically and morally distorted children, or simply “badly born” ones. 
This view underlies the reform of education, both in its institutional and 
curricular dimensions.
It is diffi cult to understand the nature of this right-wing populist “care” 
in the context of their acquiescence to children’s participation in bloody 
hunts, or their dramatic indifference towards the psychiatric protection 
of children in Poland, or their passivity in face of regularly disclosed cases 
of paedophilia in the Polish Church. Despite their declared willingness 
to defend the authority of the family, one gets the impression that right 
wing populists are interfering with the autonomy of upbringing, shaping 
characters, and even infl uencing the models of intimate life. 
Conclusions
In this paper we have tried to show how children and their problems 
have been used over the last few years in various areas of policy by PiS – 
the party in power in Poland. It can be argued that the presence of these 
issues in public space is something natural and obvious, especially in the 
politics of the European right. Any economic, educational, environmental, 
cultural, family, health, safety, etc. policy always affects children to some 
extent, and it would be irresponsible to ignore them.36 Children have 
always been a symbol of hope, and as such have been used in political 
propaganda in Poland before. On the other hand, today we are dealing not 
35  Prezydent w TVP Historia: Dzieci i wnuki zdrajców Rzeczypospolitej zajmu-
ją eksponowane stanowiska, „Gazeta Wyborcza” 30.04.2017, https://wyborcza.
pl/7,75398,21751420,prezydent-w-tvp-historia-spor-o-zolnierzy-wykletych-to-takze.
html (access 8.02.2021). 
36  S.A. Sherr, Scenes from the Political Playground: An Analysis of the Symbolic 
Use of Children in Presidential Campaign Advertising, “Political Communication”, no. 
16(1)/1999, pp. 45–59, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/105846099198767.
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only with ordinary moral conservatism, but rather with populism, because 
this issue and the way it is used reveal almost all the most characteristic 
features of populist politics and discourse, which quite freely exploit 
values  from often different ideological orders. 
First, children are used to increase social divisions. They are presented 
as victims of the post-communist legacy; the unjust reforms of the 
transition period; and the liberal changes that brought about Poland’s 
membership in the European Union. Secondly, children are the object of 
a national-conservative politics that, through schools and new curricula, 
indoctrinate them within a new memory politics and conservative moral 
principles. Third, children are used to justify key reforms in the areas of 
education, social security, immigration policy, etc., following the message 
that the state institutions that functioned so far were only nominally 
democratic and, in fact, did not fulfi l their mission. Fourth, children, as 
a symbolic projection of the nation’s future and the main concern of all the 
people in dealing with their problems, are used to point out all kinds of 
social, ideological, historical, institutional etc. enemies. Fifth, children are 
therefore an instrument for manifesting otherness, which – per analogiam 
to defenceless, innocent and suffering people – is constantly threatened. 
Sixth, according to Gramsci and Bourdieu, children are in effect used to 
reproduce political and social hegemony. Seventh, children are treated 
instrumentally not only as the subject of politics, but in an anthropological 
dimension as beings devoid of subjectivity and all agency. This is not only 
an outdated way of thinking about children, but it also stands in confl ict 
with the latest research in the fi eld of children’s anthropology.
Using children in politics and propaganda, although practiced for a long 
time, currently remains at least morally ambiguous and requires continued 
research and verifi cation of the boundary that separates the public good 
from harmful manipulations with respect to their participation. Such 
research seems to be particularly important in the present times, marked 
by an increasingly visible crisis of liberal democracies, a new wave of 
populist and reactionary movements (not only in Poland, but throughout 
the region and the world), as well as in the face of increasingly dramatic 
questions about the prospects of societies that will be guided someday by 
our children. 
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